network – nipper

Nipper performs security audits of network device configuration files.

Backtrack 5R3

1. Console or SSH to a Cisco device and do a show run to see all the config. Copy it to gedit or notepad.
Save to your chosen directory.

_ __ (_)_ __ _ __ ___ _ __ / ->/|
| '_ \| | '_ \| '_ \ / _ \ '__| /<-_/ |
| | | | | |_) | |_) | __/ | | | /
|_| |_|_| .__/| .__/ \___|_| |___|/
|_| |_|

Version 0.11.10
http://nipper.titania.co.uk
Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Ian Ventura-Whiting

ERROR: The input was either an empty file or a directory.

For additional help:
--help[=]
Show the online help or show the additional help on the topic
specified. The help topics are; GENERAL, DEVICES, DEVICES-ADV,
SNMP, REPORT, REPORT-ADV, REPORT-SECT, REPORT-HTML, REPORT-LATEX,
AUDIT-ACL, AUDIT-PASS, AUDIT-ADV or CONFIG-FILE.

2. root@bt:~# nipper --ios-router --input=/root/Nipper/config --output=/root/Nipper/report.html

3. Open the directory and you should see the output file. Open with firefox and read.

Results copied from the output .html to show the level of detail you get.

Nipper

Cisco Router Security Report
of the
R1 Cisco Router
Contents
1. About This Report
1.1. Organisation
1.2. Conventions
2. Security Audit
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Inbound TCP Connection Keep Alives
2.3. Connection Timeout
2.4. Auxiliary Port
2.5. IP Source Routing
2.6. Telnet
2.7. ICMP Redirects
2.8. Logging
2.9. Proxy ARP
2.10. Cisco Discovery Protocol
2.11. Classless Routing
2.12. Minimum Password Length
2.13. BOOTP
2.14. IP Unreachables
2.15. Service Password Encryption
2.16. Login Banner
2.17. Packet Assembler / Disassembler
2.18. Conclusions
3. Device Configuration
3.1. Introduction
3.2. General
3.3. Services
3.4. Domain Name Settings
3.5. Time Zone Settings
3.6. HyperText Transfer Protocol
3.7. Lines
3.8. Interfaces
4. Appendix
4.1. Abbreviations
4.2. Common Ports
4.3. Logging Severity Levels
4.4. Time Zones
4.5. Nipper Details

1. About This Report
1.1. Organisation
This Cisco Router R1 report was produced by Nipper on Tuesday 11st December 2012. The report contains the following sections:

a security audit report section that details any identified security-related issues. Each security issue includes a description of the issue, its impact, how easy it would be to exploit and a recommendation. The recommendations include, where appropriate, the command(s) to resolve the issue;
a configuration report section that details the configuration settings;
an abbreviations appendix section that expands any abbreviations used within the report;
a common ports appendix section that details the TCP and UDP port numbers for the common services outlined within the report;
an appendix section detailing the logging severity levels used by the logging facility;
a time zones appendix section that details a number of the most commonly used time zones;
an appendix section detailing the software used to produce this report.

1.2. Conventions
This report makes use of the text conventions outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Report text conventions Convention Description
command
This text style represents the Cisco Router command text that has to be entered literally.
string
This text style represents the Cisco Router command text that the you have to enter.
[ ]
Used to enclose a Cisco Router command option.
{ }
Used to enclose a Cisco Router command requirement.
|
Divides command option or requirement choices.

2. Security Audit
2.1. Introduction
Nipper performed a security audit of the Cisco Router R1 on Tuesday 11st December 2012. This section details the findings of the security audit together with the impact and recommendations.

2.2. Inbound TCP Connection Keep Alives
Observation: Connections to a Cisco Router device could become orphaned if a connection becomes disrupted. An attacker could attempt a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against a Cisco Router by exhausting the number of possible connections. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) keep alive messages can be configured to confirm that a remote connection is valid and then terminate any orphaned connections.

Nipper determined that TCP keep alive messages are not sent for connections from remote hosts.

Impact: An attacker could attempt a DoS by exhausting the number of possible connections.

Ease: Tools are available on the Internet that can open large numbers of TCP connections without correctly terminating them.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that TCP keep alive messages be sent to detect and drop orphaned connections from remote systems. TCP keep alive messages can be enabled for connections from remote systems using the following command:

service tcp-keepalives-in

2.3. Connection Timeout
Observation: Connection timeouts can be configured for a number of the device services. If a timeout were configured on an administrative service, an administrator that did not correctly terminate the connection would have it automatically closed after the timeout expires. However, if a timeout is not configured, or is configured to be a long timeout, an unauthorised user may be able to gain access using the administrator's previously logged-in connection.

Nipper identified three connection settings that were not configured to timeout within ten minutes, these are listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Connections with inadequate timeout periods Connection Timeout
Console line 0 No Timeout
Auxiliary line 0 No Timeout
VTY lines 0 to 4 No Timeout

Impact: An attacker who was able to gain access to a connection that had not expired, would be able to continue using that connection. A connection could be a console port on the device that was not correctly terminated or a remote administrative connection.

Ease: The attacker would have to gain physical access to the device to use the console port, or gain remote access to an administration machine that is attached to the port. To gain access to remote connections, an attacker would have to be able to intercept network traffic between the client and R1. The attacker would then have to take over the connection, which could be very difficult with some services. Tools are available on the Internet that would facilitate the monitoring of network connections.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that a timeout period of ten minutes be configured for connections to the device R1.

2.4. Auxiliary Port
Observation: The auxiliary port's primary purpose is to provide a remote administration capability. It can allow a remote administrator to use a modem to dial into the Cisco device.

Nipper determined that the auxiliary port on the Cisco device R1 allowed exec connections and did not appear to have the callback feature configured.

Impact: An attacker may discover the modem number for the device during a war-dial. If an attacker were able to connect to the device remotely, then they may be able to brute-force the login to gain access to the device.

Ease: The attacker would have to first identify the telephone number of the device, probably through a war-dial. A modem attached to a telephone line would have to be attached directly to the Cisco device's auxiliary port. Then the attacker would be able to attach to the device in order to perform a brute-force of the login.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, the auxiliary port exec be disabled. Exec can be disabled on the aux port with the following command:

no exec

If the auxiliary port is required for remote administration, the callback feature can be configured to dial a specific preconfigured telephone number.

2.5. IP Source Routing
Observation: IP source routing is a feature whereby a network packet can specify how it should be routed through the network. Cisco routers normally accept and process source routes specified by a packet, unless the feature has been disabled.

Nipper determined that IP source routing was not disabled.

Impact: IP source routing can allow an attacker to specify a route for a network packet to follow, possibly to bypass a Firewall device or an Intruder Detection System (IDS). An attacker could also use source routing to capture network traffic by routing it through a system controlled by the attacker.

Ease: An attacker would have to control either a routing device or an end point device in order to modify a packets route through the network. However, tools are available on the Internet that would allow an attacker to specify source routes. Tools are also available to modify network routing using vulnerabilities in some routing protocols.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, IP source routing be disabled. IP source routing can be disabled by issuing the following Internet Operating System (IOS) command:

no ip source routing

2.6. Telnet
Observation: Telnet is widely used to provide remote command-based access to a variety of devices and is commonly used on network devices for remote administration. However, Telnet is a clear-text protocol and is vulnerable to various packet capture techniques.

Nipper determined that Telnet was enabled on R1.

Impact: An attacker who was able to monitor network traffic could capture sensitive information or authentication credentials.

Ease: Network packet and password sniffing tools are widely available on the Internet and some of the tools are specifically designed to capture clear-text protocol authentication credentials. However, in a switched environment an attacker may not be able to capture network traffic destined for other devices without employing an attack such as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if possible, Telnet be disabled. If remote administrative access to the device is required, Nipper recommends that Secure Shell (SSH) be configured. The Telnet service can be disabled on individual lines with the following command:

transport input none

The following Cisco IOS command can be used to disable Telnet on individual lines, but enable SSH:

transport input ssh

2.7. ICMP Redirects
Observation: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) redirect messages allow systems to change the route that network traffic takes. On networks with functional network routing, disabling ICMP redirects will have little to no effect. ICMP redirects are usually enabled by default on Cisco devices.

Nipper determined that the device R1 had support for ICMP redirects enabled on the network interface FastEthernet0/0.

Impact: An attacker could use ICMP redirect messages to route network traffic through their own router, possibly allowing them to monitor network traffic.

Ease: Tools are widely available that can send ICMP redirect messages.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, ICMP redirects be disabled on all network interfaces. ICMP redirects can be disabled on each individual network interface using the following command:

no ip redirects

2.8. Logging
Observation: Logging is an essential component of a secure network configuration. Logging not only assists network administrators to identify issues when troubleshooting, but enables network administrators to react to intrusion attempts or Denial-of-Service attacks. It is therefore critical that logs be monitored, allowing administrators to take immediate action when an attack has been identified. Furthermore, system logs are a key component of a forensic investigation into past intrusions or service disruptions.

Nipper determined that logging had not been configured on R1.

Impact: An attacker could attempt to map and bypass any configured Access Control List (ACL) or to gain access to the Cisco Router without network administrators being alerted to the attempts. Furthermore, after an unauthorised intrusion into the network had been detected, it would be more difficult for an investigation to identify the source of the attack or the entry point without access to logs.

Ease: N/A

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that Syslog and Buffered logging be configured on R1. Logging can be enabled with the following command:

logging on

To configure Syslog logging, four things need to be set; a source interface for the Syslog messages to be sent from, one or more Syslog hosts to send messages to, the Syslog logging message severity level and the Syslog facility. The following commands can be used to configure Syslog logging:

logging source-interface {Interface}

logging host {Syslog IP address or hostname}

logging trap {Logging message severity level}

logging facility {Syslog facility}

Buffered logging can be configured with the following command:

logging buffered {Buffer Size} {Logging message severity level}

2.9. Proxy ARP
Observation: ARP is a protocol that network hosts use to translate network addresses into media addresses. Under normal circumstances, ARP packets are confined to the sender's network segment. However, a Cisco router with Proxy ARP enabled on network interfaces can act as a proxy for ARP, responding to queries and acting as an intermediary.

Nipper identified one interface that had Proxy ARP enabled, FastEthernet0/0.

Impact: A router that acts as a proxy for ARP requests will extend layer two access across multiple network segments, breaking perimeter security.

Ease: A Cisco device with Proxy ARP enabled will proxy ARP requests for all hosts on those interfaces.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, Proxy ARP be disabled on all interfaces. Proxy ARP can be disabled on each interface with the following Cisco IOS command:

no ip proxy-arp

2.10. Cisco Discovery Protocol
Observation: Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) is a proprietary protocol that is primarily used by Cisco, but has been used by others. CDP allows some network management applications and CDP aware devices to identify each other on a Local Area Network (LAN) segment. Cisco devices, including switches, bridges and routers are configured to broadcast CDP packets by default. The devices can be configured to disable the CDP service or disable CDP on individual network interfaces.

Nipper determined that the CDP service had not been disabled, and additionally, had not been disabled on all the active network interfaces.

Impact: CDP packets contain information about the sender, such as hardware model information, operating system version and IP address details. This information would allow an attacker to gain information about the configuration of the network infrastructure.

Ease: CDP packets are broadcast to an entire network segment. An attacker could use one of the many publicly available tools to capture network traffic and view the leaked information.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, the CDP service be disabled on the Cisco device R1. If CDP is required, Nipper recommends that CDP be disabled on all interfaces except those that are explicitly required.

The CDP service can be disabled by issuing the following Cisco IOS command:

no cdp run

CDP can be disabled on individual interfaces using the following command:

no cdp enable

In some configurations with IP phones, deployed using either Auto Discovery or Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), the CDP service may need to be enabled. In this situation CDP should be disabled on all network interfaces for which it is not required.

2.11. Classless Routing
Observation: Classless routing is enabled by default on Cisco routers. If a router has classless routing enabled and it receives a network packet for which there is no configured route, the router will forward the packet to the best destination. With classless routing disabled, the router would discard any network traffic for which no route is defined.

Nipper determined that classless routing was enabled on R1.

Impact: Network traffic that should not be routed by the router may be routed when classless routing is enabled.

Ease: N/A

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if possible, classless routing be disabled. Classless routing can be disabled with the following command:

no ip classless

2.12. Minimum Password Length
Observation: Cisco introduced an option from IOS version 12.3(1) which forces user, enable, secret and line passwords to meet a minimum length. This setting was introduced to help prevent the use of short passwords such as "cisco".

Nipper determined that a minimum password length of six characters was configured.

Impact: With a small minimum password length configured, it would be possible for a short password to be used. If an attacker were able to gain a password through dictionary-based guessing techniques or by a brute-force method, the attacker could gain a level of access to R1.

Ease: A number of dictionary-based password guessing and password brute-force tools are available on the Internet.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that a minimum password length of at least eight characters be configured. The minimum password length can be configured with the following command:

security passwords min-length {length}

2.13. BOOTP
Observation: BOOTstrap Protocol (BOOTP) is a datagram protocol that allows compatible hosts to load their operating system over the network from a BOOTP server. Cisco routers are capable of acting as BOOTP servers for other Cisco devices and the service is enabled by default. However, BOOTP is rarely used and may represent a security risk.

Nipper determined that BOOTP was not disabled. However, it is worth noting that not all Cisco devices support BOOTP.

Impact: An attacker could use the BOOTP service to download a copy of the router's IOS software.

Ease: Tools are available on the Internet to access BOOTP servers.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, the BOOTP service be disabled. The following command can be used to disable BOOTP:

no ip bootp server

2.14. IP Unreachables
Observation: ICMP IP unreachable messages can be generated by a Cisco device when a host attempts to connect to a non-existent host, network, or use an unsupported protocol. ICMP IP unreachable messages will let the connecting host know that the host, network or protocol is not supported or cannot be contacted. Therefore, the host does not have to wait for a connection time-out. ICMP IP unreachable messages are normally enabled by default on Cisco devices and must be explicitly disabled.

Nipper determined that the Cisco device R1 had ICMP IP unreachable messages enabled on the interface FastEthernet0/0.

Impact: An attacker who was performing network scans to determine what services were available would be able to scan a device more quickly.

Ease: Tools are available on the Internet that can perform a wide variety of scan types.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, IP unreachables be disabled on all network interfaces. However, whilst disabling IP unreachables will not stop scans, it does make it more difficult for an attacker. The IP unreachables option is disabled or enabled individually for each network interface. It can be disabled with the following command:

no ip unreachables

2.15. Service Password Encryption
Observation: Cisco service passwords are stored by default in their clear-text form rather than being encrypted. However, it is possible to have these passwords stored using the reversible Cisco type-7 encryption.

Nipper determined that the Cisco device R1 was not running the password encryption service that helps provide a basic level of encryption to passwords that otherwise would be stored in clear-text.

Impact: If a malicious user were to see a Cisco configuration that contained clear-text passwords, they could use the passwords to access the device. However, an attacker who had access to a Cisco configuration file would easily be able to reverse the passwords.

Ease: Even though it is trivial to reverse Cisco type-7 passwords, they do provide a greater level of security than clear-text passwords. Tools are widely available on the Internet that reverse Cisco type-7 passwords.

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that the Cisco password encryption service be enabled. The Cisco password encryption service can be started with the following Cisco IOS command:

service password-encryption

2.16. Login Banner
Observation: A banner message can be shown to users who connect to one of the remote management services, such as Telnet. Typically banner messages will include information on the law with regard to unauthorised access to the device, warning users who do not have the authority to access the device about the consequences.

Nipper determined that no login banner was configured.

Impact: Attackers who have gained access to a device could avoid legal action if no banner is configured to warn against unauthorised access.

Ease: N/A

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that a banner be configured that warns against unauthorised access. Banners are configured on Cisco devices using a delimiter character. A delimiter character is specified in the banner command and is used again to mark the end of the banner. The Cisco command to add a login banner, that is presented to users prior to authentication, is:

banner login {delimiter} The banner text {delimiter}

2.17. Packet Assembler / Disassembler
Observation: The Packet Assembler / Disassembler (PAD) service enables X.25 connections between network systems. The PAD service is enabled by default on most Cisco IOS devices but it is only required if support for X.25 links is necessary.

Nipper determined that the PAD service had not been disabled.

Impact: Running unused services increases the chances of an attacker finding a security hole or fingerprinting a device.

Ease: N/A

Recommendation: Nipper recommends that, if not required, the PAD service be disabled. Use the following command to disable the PAD service:

no service pad

2.18. Conclusions
Nipper performed a security audit of the Cisco Router device R1 on Tuesday 11st December 2012 and identified 16 security-related issues. Nipper determined that:

TCP keep alive messages are not configured for inbound connections;
all connections were not configured with secure connection timeout periods;
the AUX port was configured to allow EXEC connections without the callback functionality;
IP source routing was enabled;
clear-text remote administration was enabled using Telnet;
ICMP redirects were not disabled for all network interfaces;
insufficient logging was configured;
ARP request proxying was not disabled on all network interfaces;
CDP was not disabled;
classless routing was enabled;
an inadequate minimum password length was configured;
BootP was enabled;
IP unreachables have not been disabled on all interfaces;
the service passwords are stored in clear-text;
no login banner has been configured;
the PAD service was enabled.

3. Device Configuration
3.1. Introduction
This section details the configuration settings of the Cisco Router device R1.

3.2. General
Table 3: General device settings Description Setting
Hostname R1
IOS Version 12.4
Service Password Encryption Disabled
Minimum Password Length 6 characters
IP Source Routing Enabled
BOOTP Enabled
Service Config Disabled
TCP Keep Alives (In) Disabled
TCP Keep Alives (Out) Disabled
Cisco Express Forwarding Enabled
Gratuitous ARPs Disabled
Classless Routing Enabled

3.3. Services
Table 4: Device services Service Status
Telnet Enabled
SSH Disabled
HTTP Disabled
Finger Disabled
TCP Small Services Disabled
UDP Small Services Disabled
CDP Enabled
PAD Enabled

3.4. Domain Name Settings
Table 5: Domain name settings Description Setting
Domain Lookup Disabled

3.5. Time Zone Settings
Table 6: Time zone settings Description Setting
Time Zone UTC
UTC Offset None
Summer Time Zone Disabled
Authorative Time Source No

3.6. HyperText Transfer Protocol
Table 7: HTTP configuration Description Setting
HTTP Server Disabled
Authentication Type Enable Password
Access Class (Access List Number) Unconfigured

3.7. Lines
The Cisco line configuration settings are used to configure administrative access to the device. The console line type is used for accessing the Cisco device directly through a cable attached to the device's console port. The auxiliary lines are used for remote access to the device, typically through attached modems. The Virtual Teletype (VTY) lines are used for access to the device through a remote access service such as SSH or Telnet.

Table 8: Line configuration Line Type Start Line End Line Logins Exec Authorization Accounting Telnet SSH Timeout Exec Timeout Session Timeout Absolute Timeout Password Password Encryption
Console 0 Allowed On Off Off On Off 0s 0s 0s 0s
Auxiliary 0 Allowed On Off Off On Off 0s 0s 0s 0s
VTY 0 4 Allowed On Off Off On Off 0s 0s 0s 0s

3.8. Interfaces
Table 9: Interfaces Interface Active IP Address Proxy ARP IP Unreachable IP Redirect IP Mask Reply IP Direct Broadcast NTP CDP uRPF MOP
FastEthernet0/0 Yes 192.168.56.2 255.255.255.0 On On On Off Off On On Off Off

4. Appendix
4.1. Abbreviations
ACL Access Control List
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
BOOTP BOOTstrap Protocol
CDP Cisco Discovery Protocol
CEF Cisco Express Forwarding
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DoS Denial of Service
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IDS Intruder Detection System
IOS Internet Operating System
IP Internet Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
MOP Maintenance Operations Protocol
NTP Network Time Protocol
PAD Packet Assembler / Disassembler
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UTC Coordinated Universal Time
VTY Virtual Teletype

4.2. Common Ports
Table 10: Common ports Service Port
SSH 22
DHCP 67
HTTP 80
NTP 123
SNMP 161

4.3. Logging Severity Levels
Table 11: Logging message severity levels Level Level Name Description
0 Emergencies System is unstable
1 Alerts Immediate action is required
2 Critical Critical conditions
3 Errors Error conditions
4 Warnings Warning conditions
5 Notifications Significant conditions
6 Informational Informational messages
7 Debugging Debugging messages

4.4. Time Zones
Table 12: Common time zone acronyms Region Acronym Time Zone UTC Offset
Australia CST Central Standard Time +9.5 hours
Australia EST Eastern Standard/Summer Time +10 hours
Australia WST Western Standard Time +8 hours
Europe BST British Summer Time +1 hour
Europe CEST Central Europe Summer Time +2 hours
Europe CET Central Europe Time +1 hour
Europe EEST Eastern Europe Summer Time +3 hours
Europe EST Eastern Europe Time +2 hours
Europe GMT Greenwich Mean Time
Europe IST Irish Summer Time +1 hour
Europe MSK Moscow Time +3 hours
Europe WEST Western Europe Summer Time +1 hour
Europe WET Western Europe Time +1 hour
USA and Canada ADT Atlantic Daylight Time -3 hours
USA and Canada AKDT Alaska Standard Daylight Saving Time -8 hours
USA and Canada AKST Alaska Standard Time -9 hours
USA and Canada AST Atlantic Standard Time -4 hours
USA and Canada CDT Central Daylight Saving Time -5 hours
USA and Canada CST Central Standard Time -6 hours
USA and Canada EDT Eastern Daylight Time -4 hours
USA and Canada EST Eastern Standard Time -5 hours
USA and Canada HST Hawaiian Standard Time -10 hours
USA and Canada MDT Mountain Daylight Time -6 hours
USA and Canada MST Mountain Standard Time -7 hours
USA and Canada PDT Pacific Daylight Time -7 hours
USA and Canada PST Pacific Standard Time -3 hours

4.5. Nipper Details
This report was generated using Nipper version 0.11.10. Nipper is an Open Source tool designed to assist security professionals and network system administrators securely configure network infrastructure devices. The latest version of Nipper can be found at the following URL:

http://nipper.titania.co.uk.

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